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This paper investigates the relationship between different institutions’ GDP growth forecasts for 
the year 2020 and the actual realized growth levels in the same year. To this end, we use data 
from the IMF and World Bank’s publications and show that on average, an economy has 
overperformed its expected growth rate when i) the sizes of announced fiscal and macro-
financial stimulus measures are larger, ii) The extent of the government stringency measures is 
smaller, iii) the pre-pandemic level of GDP per capita is larger. Our results can be crucial for 
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The Covid-19 pandemic has affected the world very negatively in many ways. Due to prolonged 
shutdowns, both businesses and employees faced economic difficulties. Although some countries 
have managed to overcome the epidemic to some extent, some countries are still struggling with 
the economic downturn. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as some other 
international institutions, such as the World Bank (WB) and the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been traditionally making growth predictions for the 
world economy as well as for their member countries.   
 
Traditionally, IMF has been publishing its forecasts in its flagship publication of World 
Economic Outlook twice a year, one in April and the second one in October. On the other hand, 
WB has the flagship publication of the Global Economic Prospects, in which it publishes its 
growth forecasts, again twice a year, one in June and yet another in December. They also 
published their growth forecasts in the middle of the pandemic in 2020. IMF published its 
growth forecasts in April 2020 (IMF, 2020a) and the WB in June 2020. (WB, 2020) 
Nevertheless, as also thoroughly explained in the existing literature on the predictive power of 
these forecasts and their deviations from the actual growth rates, in this paper, we examine the 
deviations of IMF’s and WB’s 2020 growth forecasts from the realized actual 2020 GDP growth 
rates. 
 
Notably, we look at whether stimulus packages and pandemic measures taken by national 
governments towards mitigating the adverse impact of the pandemic played a role in these 
deviations. During the pandemic, national governments all around the world have announced 
substantial stimulus packages. In certain countries, particularly the developed ones, such as the 
US, the EU members, and Japan, fiscal measures reached levels that are larger than 25% of GDP. 
Fiscal measures were also supplemented by various other macro-financial measures and 
monetary policy in the form of reductions in the policy interest rates and reserve requirement 
ratios. (Elgin, Basbug, and Yalaman. 2021) It goes without saying that these substantial packages 
that the world has never seen prior to the pandemic might have affected the actual growth 
performances of the economies. For example, labor market and credit measures that helped 
businesses not to go bankrupt and workers not to lose their jobs could have reduced the 
magnitude of the economic downturn and therefore lead the growth forecasts of the IMF and WB 
to deviate from the actual values. 
 
There is also vast literature on measuring the nature and determinants of the accuracy of the 
forecasts of different international organizations.  
 
In a somewhat technical paper by Pons (2000), the size of the errors in the growth estimates of 
the G7 countries is examined. While investigating the accuracy of the predictions, an evaluation 
was made based on several different features. Accepting the estimation as correct depends on 
two critical statistical properties: unbiasedness and efficiency. In addition, directional accuracy 
tests are one of the essential topics covered in this paper. 
 
In another related paper, Batchelor (2001) compares the accuracy and usefulness of the economic 
forecasts made by the OECD and the IMF again for the G7 countries against the predictions 
made by a private sector company. The author finds that private sector estimates are more 
accurate and unbiased, with few exceptions. The author then concludes that, in general, there is 
minimal information in the OECD and IMF forecasts that can be used to reduce the error in 
private sector predictions. 
 
Next, Aldenhoff (2007) brings a political economy dimension to the forecasts of the IMF. In this 
paper, the author examines how the deviations in IMF predictions are affected. Based on the 
findings listed in the paper, the author argues that prediction errors were greater in wealthier 
countries. In short, forecasts have been adversely affected by the spirit of the times. As this 
article shows, the biased of the forecasts can vary across different country groups. Based on this, 
we can put forward that if the predictions made are affected by outside developments; 
pessimistic forecasts could have been made due to the demoralizing environment brought by the 
Covid-19 epidemic. 
 
In two other related articles in the literature, first, Dreher, Marchesi, and Vreeland (2008) discuss 
the IMF’s different macroeconomic forecasts for a set of 157 countries. They find estimation 
bias in inflation and GDP growth rates. The authors use these findings to justify that the IMF is 
generally making a ‘’defensive forecast’’.  Finally, in the second article, An et al. (2019) indicate 
that the internal consistency of the IMF’s growth and unemployment forecasts is associated with 
the ‘’Okun’s Law’’, which associates GDP growth rates with unemployment. To summarize, in 
this paper, the evaluation of unemployment predictions has been made, which the IMF has not 
scrutinized before. 
 
Closely related to the findings obtained in the earlier literature, as explained above, the primary 
contribution of this article is that it reveals the most important factors for the deviations in the 
estimates made for 165 countries due to the large stimulus packages announced in the Covid-19 
pandemic. We find that the size of the announced fiscal and macro-financial policies, income 
per-capita, and government stringency measures taken during the pandemic are among the 
variables that were significantly correlated with the difference between the actual GDP growth 
and growth forecasts of the IMF made in the beginning of the pandemic. Accordingly, countries 
that announced less strict measures, that are richer, and that implemented larger fiscal and 
macro-financial packages have overall outperformed the forecasts made by the IMF in April 
2020. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present our dataset and 
discuss the statistical methodology we will use in our analysis. In the third section, we will 
present our results. Finally, in section 4, we provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
In the empirical analysis that will be presented in the next section, we use the following 
variables: First, we compare and contrast the findings vis-à-vis the difference between the actual 
2020 GDP growth rates and the three forecasts made by the IMF and the WB. The two forecasts 
of the IMF were made in April and October 2020, in two subsequent editions of the World 
Economic Outlook (IMF, 2020a and IMF, 2020b), and the WB’s 2020 GDP growth forecast is 
obtained from the Global Economic Prospects of the published in June 2020. (WB, 2020) We 
primarily look at the difference between the actual growth rates obtained from the April 2021 
edition of the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2021) and the three predictions listed above. 
 
To see which variables these forecast errors are correlated with, we use three policy variables. 
These are the fiscal and macro-financial stimulus packages (both denoted in % GDP) that were 
announced towards mitigating the adverse economic impacts of the pandemic as well as the 
policy rate cuts (in %) that the central banks decided. All three variables come from Elgin, 
Basbug, and Yalaman (2020). 
 
We also look at the correlation between three more variables and forecasts errors. These 
variables are 2020 GDP per-capita levels (from WEO, 2021), the ratio of Covid-19 infections to 
the population (from Worldometers, 2020), and an index of government stringency measures 
taken during the pandemic. The source for this last variable is Hale et al. (2020). 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Remarkably, the Table shows the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum 
values of all variables, along with the number of observations for each variable. Our 
methodology will rely on simple correlation analysis. We observe from the Table that all 
variables exhibit enough variation that allows them to be used in a correlation analysis. We will 
simply present the statistical correlations between the forecast errors and the variables that were 
explained above. 
 
From Table 1, we also observe that the best estimate of GDP growth the IMF based on average is 
the one it made in fall 2020. It is also possible to see that the forecasts made in the fall are more 
pessimistic. This could reflect the pessimism created by the second wave of the pandemic that 
was observed in fall 2020. In line with this, the IMF's best estimate based on the median is also 
in the spring 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 





6.79 7.58 4.04 -5.00 54.90 167 
Rate Cut (%) 23.58 29.65 15.56 -105.56 100.00 167 
Macrofinancial 
(% GDP) 
6.93 10.00 2.99 0.00 64.64 167 
IMF Spring 20 
Growth 
Forecast (%) 
-3.45 3.63 -3.74 -12.17 4.52 162 
IMF Fall 20 
Growth 
Forecast (% 
-5.31 4.63 -5.00 -25.00 3.80 162 
WB June 20 
Growth 
Forecast (% 
-2.63 6.12 -3.20 -13.50 51.10 120 
Actual Growth 
Rate in 2020 
(%) 












65.89 13.81 68.102 14.32 94.38 160 
 
 
In addition, this forecast is the closest to actual growth. When we compare the predictions made 
by the WB with the predictions made by the IMF, we see that the WB makes forecasts for fewer 
countries. (42 countries less) The difference may also affect the forecasts. Compared to the 
IMF’s estimates, the variation of the forecasts by the WB is also very high, and the means and 
medians are farther away from the actual values. That is why we primarily use IMF’s estimates 
in our analysis presented in the next section. Moreover, since we want to compare the actual 
values and forecasts made at the beginning of the pandemic, we primarily rely on the IMF’s 




In this section, we present our correlation analysis with several different figures, as illustrated 
below. 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and fiscal stimulus packages (as % GDP) announced during the pandemic. There 
is a positive correlation of 0.30 between the two variables. The gap between forecasts and actual 
growth grew as governments intervened and announced larger packages. In other words, it would 
be appropriate to say that, as observed in Figure 1, the large packages announced and the 
deviation rates in the forecasts increase in direct proportion to each other, and this contributes 
positively to the growth prospects for many countries during the pandemic. 
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Figure 2. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Spring Forecast: The Role of the Monetary Policy 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and percentage cut in the policy rate (in %) announced during the pandemic.   
 
Looking at the figure, there is a slight negative correlation of -0.05 between the two variables. 
However, it would be misleading to say that there is a significant correlation. From this, we can 
conclude that the interest rate cut alone did not significantly affect the difference between the 
actual growth rates and the prediction. Accordingly, monetary policy and lowered interest rates 
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Figure 3. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Spring Forecast: The Role of the Macro-Financial 
Policy 
 
Figure 3 presents the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and macro-financial stimulus packages (as % GDP) announced during the 
pandemic. In this figure, there is a 0.22 significant positive correlation between the two 
variables. Here, we can conclude that there is a directly proportional relationship between the 
extent of macro-financial policies and the growth prospects over the forecasts. The larger the 
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Figure 4. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Spring Forecast: The Role of the Fiscal and Macro-
Financial (sum of both) Policy 
 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and the sum of the macro-financial and fiscal stimulus packages (as % GDP) 
announced during the pandemic.  The relationships with the fiscal and the macro-financial 
packages alone are already presented in Figure 1 and Figure 3. Considering the fourth figure, it is 
seen that there is a positive 0.27 significant correlation between the two variables. On top of 
figures 1 and 3, Figure 4 indicates that the positive correlation even persists when we consider 
the combined fiscal and macro-financial stimulus packages and that this sum is crucial for the 
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Figure 5. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Spring Forecast: The Role of the Government 
Stringency 
 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and the strictness of government stringency measures taken during the 
pandemic. According to Figure 5, a significant negative 0.35 correlation stands out between the 
two variables. Furthermore, the growth in the countries that decided to implement tighter 
lockdown measures was below the expectations. As the severity of the lockdown measures 
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Figure 6. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Spring Forecast: The Role of the GDP per-capita 
 
Figure 6 plots the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
Spring by IMF) and the real GDP per capita (in 2020 USD).  This suggests that in richer 
countries, the actual growth rated overperformed the forecasts. This is because rich countries 
have access to more resources. Having more resources is also one of the most critical factors 
leading to the implementation of larger packages. In addition, rich countries mobilized more 
quickly than others. We observe that there is a positive relationship between wealth and the 
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Figure 7. Growth Realization vs. WB’ June Forecast: The Role of the Fiscal Policy 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted growth (in 
June by the WB) and fiscal stimulus packages (as % GDP) announced during the pandemic. 
When we look at the figure, we encounter the version of the first figure prepared for the 
predictions made by the World Bank. However, contrary to the IMF’s forecasts, there is no 
significant relationship (correlation=0.03) between the variables. One of the reasons for this lack 
of significance could be the differences between the number of countries and the high standard 
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Figure 8. Growth Realization vs. IMF’s Fall Forecast: The Role of the Fiscal Policy 
 
Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between the difference in the actual and predicted 
growth (in Fall by IMF) and fiscal stimulus packages (as % GDP) announced during the 
pandemic. Unlike the other figures, the IMF's autumn forecasts, not the spring ones, are used 
herein our eighth and last figure. Moreover, unlike Figure 1, where the IMF's spring forecasts 
were used, there is not much of a significant correlation here. One explanation for this could be 
that a certain amount of time is needed for the fiscal packages to affect growth. Other predictions 
were made at the beginning of the year (in April 2020) and have not yet had enough time to take 
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude, in this paper, we investigated the relationship between IMF’s and WB’s GDP 
growth forecasts and the actual realized growth levels in 2020. We used data from the IMF and 
WB’s flagship publications and showed that on average, an economy had overperformed its 
expected growth rate (compared to the expectations formed in April 2020 by the IMF) when i) 
the sizes of announced fiscal and macro-financial stimulus measures (denominated as a percent 
of GDP) are larger, ii) The extent of the government stringency measures towards restricting 
public life is smaller, iii) the pre-pandemic level of GDP per capita is larger. 
 
However, these differences between actual growth rates and the forecasts are not exhibited when 
we use the forecasts from later periods such as June or October 2020. One reason for this could 
be that the packages described need a certain time, i.e., come with a lag to show their effects on 
the economy. Another reason that may lead to such difference could be that the WB’s June 
forecasts include significantly lower number (42, to be exact) of countries than the IMF’s 
forecasts. 
 
We wrote this article at the beginning of 2021, but we cannot say that the pandemic has been 
concluded yet. Many economies are expected to recover from the downturn brought by the 
pandemic sharply; however, there is still significant uncertainty. In the future, when the 
pandemic ends, new research should be conducted, particularly focusing on different paths of 
recoveries and also use data for the vaccination rate. Vaccination rate, which drastically differs 
across countries, is an essential variable and can change growth rates for countries in a 
significant way.  
 
Moreover, our simple statistical analysis should also be complemented by a deeper econometric 
analysis or through economic-theoretical models to identify the economic mechanism behind the 
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